A number of security certifications for small-and medium-size enterprises have been proposed, but how effective are these schemes? We evaluated the effectiveness of Cyber Essentials and found that its security controls work well to mitigate threats that exploit vulnerabilities remotely with commodity-level tools.
itated many of these SMEs, providing the means to connect with a larger audience, expanding their market reach. But it has also exposed their operations to risks from cyberthreats. Although larger organizations will often have preallocated resources to combat and maintain security in the face of cyberattacks, the additional focus and resources required to establish and maintain a secure online presence often result in SMEs being left unprotected.
For instance, approximately 49% of SMEs suffered an attack in the United Kingdom in 2017, 3 and approximately 61% of SMEs suffered a cyberattack in the United States. 4 In addition, SMEs are often part of the supply chain for larger organizations; therefore, they can introduce risk not only for their own data and security but also for those Basic Cyber Hygiene: Does It Work?
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of their customers and partners. There are multiple examples of organizations being attacked because other organizations in their supply chain were compromised, such as the infamous Target and Home Depot breaches 5 as well as the Stuxnet attack. 6 Some low-cost initiatives have aimed at improving the cybersecurity of SMEs. These include a subset of the security controls considered by schemes and frameworks for larger organizations, such as the very well-known and widely used ISO 27000 series and the Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls. Examples of these low-cost initiatives for SMEs include several good practices and guidance around the globe, 7 such as the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NISTIR-7621, Small Business Information Security: The Fundamentals, the Belgian Cyber Security Guide, and the French Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises (CGPME) and Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI) Guide Des Bonnes Practiques De L'Informatique, as well as assurance schemes, such as the U.K.'s Cyber Essentials. 8 To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of such initiatives, yet such schemes are becoming mandatory. (See "Related Work on SME Security.") Cyber Essentials was made mandatory for all suppliers of U.K. government contracts involving "the handling of sensitive and personal information and provision of certain technical products and services." 9 Large private-sector companies also require it for their supply chain; for example, Hewlett-Packard in the United Kingdom requires Cyber Essentials for its entire supply chain (approximately 600 SMEs). 10 Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of these schemes is becoming even more important given the almost regulatory nature such schemes are acquiring.
We conducted an effectiveness evaluation of one such scheme, Cyber Essentials. We found that the Cyber Essentials security controls worked well in the SMEs we studied to mitigate the threats these security controls were designed for (that is, those threats exploiting vulnerabilities remotely with commodity-level tools), completely mitigating approximately two thirds of this type of vulnerability and partially mitigating almost an addition third, with very few immitigable vulnerabilities. Although we focus on Cyber Essentials, the results may also be applicable to other schemes for SMEs like the examples from NIST, ANSSI, and Belgium, as they include all or most of the Cyber Essentials security controls. Other schemes for SME around the globe recommend security controls similar to those included in Cyber Essentials. For instance, NISTIR-7621 includes, among others, the five security controls of Cyber Essentials, and the Belgian and the CGPME/ANSSI schemes include some form of patch management, malware protection, secure configuration, and access control. Refer to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security's "Review of Cyber Hygiene Practices" 7 for a detailed analysis of these schemes and Cyber Essentials, together with their commonalities and differences. The security controls of Cyber Essentials and similar schemes are particularly aimed at providing a basic level of cybersecurity that is as cheap to implement as possible; yet they should defend against remotely exploitable, commodity-level vulnerabilities.
CYBER ESSENTIALS
11 Therefore, to evaluate the extent to which these security controls actually defend against this type of vulnerabilities, we randomly chose 200 vulnerabilities (shown by severity and type in Figure 1 ) from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database 12 for the two years preceding 2015, which were the most recent data on vulnerabilities available when the vulnerability collection was performed, amounting to a total of 10,488 vulnerabilities. We used random sampling, which means that, with a 95% confidence interval, the results we obtained may be generalized to that total amount with an error of ±6.9%. 13 The severity and type of each vulnerability were obtained for each CVE vulnerability using the standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). 14 To conduct the vulnerability assessment and assess the effectiveness of the five Cyber Essentials security controls, and due to the nature of SMEs that do not have the resources to separate testing from operational systems, we sought to avoid active security-testing techniques like penetration testing, which may have an operational impact on this already resource-constrained type of businesses.
Instead, we used a less aggressive approach, particularly employing architectural reviews, configuration reviews, and interviews (which are, however, known to be some of the most cost-effective security testing techniques in practice). 15 As part of the assessment, we first mapped between each selected SME's characteristics (see the "Case Studies" section) and network features on the one hand and the 200 randomly selected vulnerabilities on the other. We looked at the specific hardware and software used and organizational practices and policies to determine whether a vulnerability would be applicable to each SME, using the information elicited during the architectural and configuration reviews and interviews. Then, a double-vetted (i.e., two researchers working independently from each other) process of mitigation assessment was conducted by considering the applicable vulnerabilities and whether or not the vulnerabilities would be mitigated if the security controls were implemented in the SMEs.
RELATED WORK ON SME SECURITY
V ery few previous works have considered small and medium-size enterprise (SME) security, with notable exceptions including the following.
Some works focused on the acceptance, suitability, and feasibility of the use in practice of well-known information security standards by SMEs. For instance, Kluge and Sambasivam S1 showed that when ISO 27001 was applied to medium-sized enterprises, many of the requirements of the standard were unattainable. This confirms the findings of other studies, which have pointed out that SMEs face many barriers to applying general-purpose security standards like ISO 27001, including a lack of skilled resources, the time needed to apply the standard, the complexity of the standard, the cost of the certification process, and a clear quantification of the benefits of applying the standard.
S2
Other works focused on studying and understanding the security culture of SMEs. For instance, Dojkovski et al. S3 showed that SME owners lacked an understanding of the strategic value of IT to their business and that security technologies were viewed as business costs rather than strategic enablers. They also highlighted the need for the development of special information security risk assessment standards tailored to SMEs. More recently, Parkin et al. S4 presented an abstract model to calculate the indirect costs of deploying security controls based on Cyber Essentials in SMEs. However, to our knowledge, no work has studied the effectiveness of security controls in standards and guidelines specifically tailored to SMEs.
Case studies
The SMEs we studied represent organizations from a range of market sectors, including finance (SME 1), specialist scientific services (SME 2), web development and online presence (SME 3), and hospitality services (SME 4). We conducted a wider survey to ensure that the four SMEs were representative of the SME sector in terms of their characteristics and IT systems; the total number of SMEs surveyed was 20. (For a full breakdown of the survey questions, refer to Such et al. 16 ) In particular, Table 1 contrasts the four SMEs selected with the 20 SMEs surveyed. The darker the color in the "Sur vey" column, then the higher the proportion of the 20 SMEs claiming to have these characteristics (with white meaning none and black meaning all of them). The four SMEs we selected are representative of a range of different characteristics to maximize variety, but they also cover all of the characteristics indicated by a darker color, which were predominant and most prevalent in the 20 SMEs surveyed.
Importantly, the predominant characteristics of the 20 SMEs surveyed match the results obtained in larger surveys such as the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 3 (which included more than 1,300 SMEs). Although these larger surveys included fewer characteristics, those involved largely match our results (e.g., bring your own device, third-party services, and so on). However, this does not mean that the results we obtained for the four SMEs we studied in detail are completely generalizable to all SMEs, and any generalizations from our research should be made with care. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the main characteristics and services of the SMEs, with their network diagrams shown in Figure 2 .
MAIN FINDINGS
Applicable vulnerabilities depend on more than network/ service complexity We followed the method described for the 200 randomly selected vulnerabilities and found that 137 were applicable to at least one SME (with 63 out of the 137 applicable to all SMEs), which clearly suggests that SMEs are indeed very vulnerable. In particular, we can observe in Figure 3 (a) that, in all SMEs, very high-risk vulnerabilities (according to their CVSS rating) largely dominate. This can be partially explained by Figure 3 (b), which shows that the most common types of vulnerabilities are denial of services, code execution, and gaining privileges. Figure 3 shows SME 1 in first place in terms of the number of applicable vulnerabilities, which is mainly due to its more complex network and also the high number of local services offered, together with the use of both Windows and Linux (see Table 1 ). However, applicable vulnerabilities and, in particular, their severity, do not only depend on the complexity of the network and the services offered. Indeed, when we observe the results for SME 3 and SME 4, they seem counterintuitive. These SMEs have a simpler network and fewer local services running than SME 2 and SME 1, and yet they have more applicable vulnerabilities than SME 2, with even a few more very high-risk vulnerabilities than SME 1.
THE ACTUAL BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS ALSO PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN DETERMINING THE ATTACK SURFACE.
There are a number of explanations for this beyond the complexity of the network diagram. For instance, SME 3 (web development) has the business requirement that everything they develop should operate across multiple web browsers on various versions to test and build a customer's website, which means that they accumulate all vulnerabilities in all of these different web browsers. In SME 4, guests have no restrictions placed on their network usage and, naturally, may bring their own equipment, providing a mix of all operating systems currently available, including Windows, Linux, and Mac, among others. Therefore, the actual business requirements also play a very important role in determining the attack surface. Indeed SME 1, SME 3, and SME 4 are rather different from each other, but they have similarly large attack surfaces, even though the specific vulnerabilities that may be exploited in each case are not necessarily the same. 
Characteristics
Survey SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4 reader to our technical report. 16 Figure 4 shows that these figures are similarly positive across the four SMEs, with at most 72% (SME 3) and at least 62% (SME 2) of all the applicable vulnerabilities fully mitigated. Therefore, there was a similar proportion of vulnerability mitigation, regardless of the particular SME. T here was also approximately a quarter of vulnerabilities for which Cyber Essentials security controls would partially mitigate the vulnerability. We provide more details about partially mitigated vulnerabilities later on in this section. 0 SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4 SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4
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Getting the basics right matters a great deal
Low ( (a) SME 1: finance sector, (b) SME 2: specialist group, (c) SME 3: web development, and (d) SME 4: hotel services. 
denial of service, gain privilege, execute code, and cross-site scriptingcompletely or partially mitigating almost all of them. Regarding the rest of the classes, there are good signs from the data; however, the small sample of these types of attacks makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.
Patch management, malware protection, and secure configuration are most useful
Regarding the effectiveness of each individual security control and its contribution to mitigating vulnerabilities, Figure 5 shows that the control contributing most to mitigating or partially mitigating vulnerabilities is patch management, followed by security configuration, malware protection, and firewalls and gateways. Access control came in last in terms of mitigating or partially mitigating the vulnerabilities applicable to the SMEs studied. This also highlights the importance of security controls such as patch management. However, a note should be made about correct implementation. For instance, regarding patch management, we assumed for purposes of our study that it is applied in a timely and correct manner once a patch is available, but evidence from user studies about software updates tells us that this may not always happen in practice 17 and that awareness and education mechanisms, together with the collective cybersecurity approaches described in more detail in the "Vulnerability Mitigation Still Falls to Third Parties" section, are crucial for maximizing its effectiveness. It is also important to stress again that the assessment we carried out considered threats that exploit vulnerabilities remotely with commodity-level tools, so the contribution of security 
Vulnerability mitigation still falls to third parties
Importantly, 38 of the 40 vulnerabilities judged as partially mitigated are viewed as such because they rely on patches from third-party software or hardware vendors, which will be mitigated once a security fix has been released by applying the patch management security control of Cyber Essentials. That is, the security involved in using third-party software unfortunately relies on the vendor's ability to identify potential areas of risk and quickly respond to security breaches as they become apparent with the release of patches. The other type of partially mitigated vulnerabilities relied on website blacklisting, combined with avoiding vulnerable web browser software. A secure configuration without such a browser would mitigate this vulnerability, but, as in the web development (SME 3) case study, it may not always be possible to avoid the use of a specific software piece. In a case like this, website blacklisting (part of the malware protection security control) is the only Cyber Essentials security control against these vulnerabilities.
Only two vulnerabilities were immitigable by Cyber Essentials's security controls; these were cases in which vulnerabilities were due to inherent flaws in a hardware device or to software that cannot be fixed. For devices that are fundamentally flawed from a cybersecurity standpoint, it could be that no level of security tools on top of the network can aid in mitigation-rather, the hardware should be replaced to ensure security. It may be possible to develop a public list of all such devices to serve as a device blacklist for SMEs.
There indeed exist some collective approaches to improving cybersecurity that could be especially useful for SMEs that do not have the resources to keep themselves up to date with the latest security issues. An example of this in the United Kingdom is the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Partnership. 18 The partnership aims to benefit all members by providing real-time updates on issues of cybersecurity and discovered vulnerabilities as well as best-practice guides and other cyberthreat information. It would be beneficial for more organizations to belong to cybersecurity collectives like this, creating networks of informed individuals working together to tackle cybercrime. This would be particularly useful to quickly identify potential vulnerabilities and possible patches, which, as mentioned, is critical for the patch management security control to fully mitigate related vulnerabilities. However, vulnerability information shared through these collaborative security systems is provided in highly technical terms and descriptions, which can make them particularly impenetrable to less technically adept readers. This is further compounded when exploits are described without actually explaining the problem, requiring that the reader have proprietary knowledge available to understand the problem. Ultimately, a more accessible, actionable form of addressing vulnerability issues needs to be created to allow smaller businesses the chance to implement defenses before they are attacked.
C
yber Essentials seemed to work well in the SMEs studied to mitigate the threats exploiting vulnerabilities remotely with commodity-level tools, and it appeared to completely mitigate approximately two-thirds of this type of vulnerability and partially mitigate almost a further third, with only a few immitigable vulnerabilities. The results may also be partially applicable to other schemes for SMEs in other countries that include/share all or most of the Cyber Essentials controls.
The scope of this study covers only the threats exploiting vulnerabilities remotely with commodity-level tools. There is an increasingly identified risk from insider threats that also requires attention-not just from malicious acts but also from users unknowingly compromising security or falling for social engineering, such as phishing. Also, advanced, persistent threats and other targeted attacks were not considered here. Although one might think that this type of threat more often targets organizations larger than SMEs, there is evidence to suggest that very targeted attacks coming from those threats now also focus on compromising the digital supply chain of big organizations starting from other, sometimes smaller, organizations (e.g., the infamous Stuxnet, which reached Iranian power plants 6 indirectly through their supply chain, or the Target and Home Depot breaches 5 ). The results we obtained depend on an almost-perfect adherence to the guidelines for implementing Cyber Essentials security controls. Although Cyber Essentials is one of the very few schemes for SMEs (the only one to the best of our knowledge) that actually includes an assurance framework (i.e., it specifies the way in which adherence to the framework can be ensured), a lingering question may still be whether
and to what extent an SME certified to have Cyber Essentials adheres to its guidelines, which may affect the effectiveness of its security controls (see, for example, the discussion about known issues with the implementation of some security controls like patch management). Although recent work has looked at the cost-effectiveness of assurance techniques to reveal the security state of a system in general, 14 future work should look specifically at the effectiveness of the assurance techniques used for SME schemes in ensuring adherence to the guidelines as well as the effect this has, in turn, on security controls and their ability to mitigate vulnerabilities. The security of business affiliates and service providers should also be considered. Even if an SME has security controls in place, any use of cloud services relies on the vendor's security controls for threat mitigation. In other words, cloud-based email, banking and accounting, file sharing, and any other cloud-based or remote service (shown in Table 1 to be extensively used by SMEs) are only as secure as the service provider makes them. In general, the providers of these services should be encouraged to certify their protection (e.g., through frameworks like the ISO 27000 series) so that SMEs can make better and more informed choices regarding the cloud services they use. 
